Previous studies of the electoral consequences of corruption in Spanishlocal elections (JiménezRevista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas, 6(2):43–76,2007; Fernández-Vázquez and Rivero2011,Consecuencias electorales de lacorrupción,2003–2007. Estudios de Progreso, Fundación Alternativas; Costas et al.European Journal of Political Economy: 28(4):469-484,2012) have found that votersdo not necessarily punish corrupt mayors. As has been pointed out in the comparativeliterature, the average loss of electoral support by corrupt incumbents is small anddoes not prevent their reelection most of the times (Jiménez and Caínzos2006, Howfar and why do corruption scandals cost votes? In Garrard, J. and Newell, J. (eds.)Scandals in past and contemporary politics. Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress). What remains unsolved, however, is the remarkable variability in this pattern.This article explores some of the micro-level variables that may mediate the effect ofcorruption scandal on the votes. We focus on three factors: ideological closeness tothe incumbent party, political sophistication, and employment status. Our resultsprovide only partial support for our hypotheses, suggesting that the effects ofcorruption are much more complex than what may seem at first sight.